Invited Speakers

We’re excited to announce that the Metropolitan Police will join us again this year for another insightful and engaging talk.

Stay tuned for updates on our invited speakers and the full event programme—more details coming soon!

Gary Eppich

Gary Eppich is the Unit Head for nuclear forensics and radiological crime scene management in the Division of Nuclear Security at the International Atomic Energy Agency. A geochemist with experience in nuclear forensics and safeguards, he has over 12 years of experience in supporting global efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, trafficking, and the misuse of nuclear and radioactive material.

Abstract

Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive material, or of evidence that is contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national law related to nuclear security. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Division of Nuclear Security assists States in the development of technical and associated capabilities in nuclear forensics. Here we describe the IAEA’s programme of State support in nuclear forensics, describing the training courses and workshops, publications, coordinated research projects, and other mechanism by which the IAEA assists States in building capacity. We highlight the impact of the IAEA’s programme in assisting States in the development of technical and human resources necessary to sustain a nuclear forensics capability commensurate with their specific needs and requirements. We also describe future developments in the programme to meet the ever-evolving needs of States as peaceful uses of nuclear and radiological material become more widespread.

Shaun Hipgrave

Shaun Hipgrave is Director Protect and Prepare, two of the Ps from the UK Counter Terrorism Strategy CONTEST. He has been serving the public either in the Amry, Police or Civil Service for over 30 year and has spent 13 years in the private sector.

He was the former Head of the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSARC) in the Homeland Security Group of the Home Office, which runs the Home Office Security and Policing show every year and is the main route for Home Office engagement with the security industry sector and the prosperity agenda.

Shaun has been working in the security sector for over 25 years. After serving in the British Army, he joined Northumbria Police where he served for 13 years, mainly in investigation and intelligence roles. In 2003 he joined the private sector combinating being the Managing Director of FTS, a services and software forensic telecoms company focused in the criminal justice space and spending 5 years with IBM.

In Shaun’s current role he is responsible for the protection for people and places from National Security threats, the SRO of Martyn’s Law, The Senior Sponsor of the Security Industry Authority, and has been leading the work to support he victims of terrorism since 2019.

Naomi Marks

Naomi Marks is the Associate Program Leader for Fundamental Science within the Nuclear Counter Terrorism and Counter Proliferation Portfolio within N Program and is responsible for foundational research in support of Materials Science. In addition to the Fundamental Science portfolio, Marks is also deeply engaged in Pre-Detonation Technical Nuclear Forensics both operationally and in the R&D activities. Marks has supported nuclear materials provenance assessment, and several international nuclear forensics engagements for the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program. Marks is currently serving as the Science Integration Lead for the Venture on Intentional Forensics. In support of the National Nuclear Materials Archive, Marks has led the development of Arcana, the National Nuclear Materials Archive Database. She currently serves as one of the scientific co-chairs for the International Technical Working Group for Nuclear Forensics.

Marks is currently supporting the Advanced and Small Modular Reactors Initiative, helping to develop LLNL’s research and development portfolio focused on non-proliferation, forensics, safeguards, and materials attractiveness. Prior to entering graduate school, Naomi worked variously as a geologist, environmental remediation specialist, summer camp counselor, organic farmer, chauffeur, hospital bed installer, grower of e. coli, and a retail salesperson specializing in woolen socks.

Advancing Nuclear Security Through the Development of Nuclear Forensic Signatures for Future Fuels

As nuclear energy systems evolve beyond conventional light-water reactor designs, the need for rapid, reliable characterization of advanced fuel forms has become increasingly important for nuclear forensics and global security applications. Technical nuclear forensics has historically centered on pressurized water reactor fuels, which are comparatively well characterized and widely understood. In contrast, advanced and small modular reactors introduce fuel types such as high-assay low-enriched uranium, molten salts, and TRISO-based fuels that exhibit distinct physical and chemical properties, along with forensic signatures that are not yet fully established. These emerging materials present new analytical challenges because their composition, microstructure, and processing histories may differ substantially from those of traditional reactor fuels.

This work seeks to identify the critical forensic signatures of novel advanced reactor fuel forms through a coordinated program of material acquisition, fabrication, and analysis using samples with well-documented provenance. To address the complexity of these fuels, we are applying and refining a suite of non-destructive and destructive techniques, including x-ray computed tomography, secondary ion mass spectrometry, optical microscopy, resonance ultrasound spectroscopy, UV-visible spectroscopy, and Raman spectroscopy. Together, these methods provide complementary insight into the morphology, chemistry, isotopic composition, and mechanical behavior of TRISO particles, TRISO fuel elements, and molten salt systems. The resulting data will help define nuclear forensics signatures associated with future fuels including matrix anisotropy, particle packing density, salt speciation, chemical states, impurity distributions, and isotopic variability.

Lee Packer

Packer is an internationally recognised nuclear science expert and UKAEA Fellow. He possesses more than 25 years of research and industrial experience. He leads R&D in nuclear technology, specialising in neutronics, nuclear forensics, radiation detection, and metrology. He has served as an IAEA consultant, where he has analysed the proliferation considerations of emerging nuclear technologies such as nuclear fusion or intense accelerator-based neutron sources. Packer previously led the Applied Radiation Technology group at UKAEA for over a decade and, further back, headed a Radiometrics Group at AWE. As an Honorary Professor at the University of Birmingham, he lectures and conducts research on nuclear fusion-related technology. He is also an IOP Fellow with more than 100 scientific publications and an h-index of 30.

Abstract

Verifying the absence of undeclared nuclear material: neutronic methods and nuclear forensic signatures towards evaluating the misuse of fusion technology

The development of fusion energy technology offers an opportunity to deliver secure, low-carbon baseload power for generations. Because these technologies do not require nuclear material to operate, their inherent proliferation risk profile is fundamentally lower than that of conventional fission reactors. However, fusion systems utilising deuterium-tritium fuel will generate an exceptionally high-fluence neutron environment, particularly when operating above the megawatt power scale with correspondingly high operational availability. This intense neutron field theoretically provides a capability to breed special fissionable material (SFM) if undeclared source material is introduced into the flux. While recognising the many peaceful applications of high-intensity neutron fields, ensuring robust monitoring to prevent the introduction of undeclared source material into the facility and subsequent diversion of nuclear material to military applications would be needed. Consequently, a clear understanding of the specific features and operations of fusion designs that would merit safeguards attention is required so that effective verification measures may be applied to ensure that the facility remains dedicated to peaceful power generation. Potential exceptions where declared nuclear material could be present in fusion facilities are restricted to specific design features, such as depleted uranium beds for tritium storage located remote from the neutron field, or unavoidable low-level source material impurities in breeding blanket components such as beryllium.

Motivated by these needs, this presentation outlines an analysis approach utilising neutronics modelling to characterise the operational environment of example fusion systems. Through simplified, illustrative models, the study evaluates the neutron fields inherent to fusion technology, establishing example signatures associated with standard power generation and contrasting them with theoretical deviations that would signal a departure from declared operations.

Using this approach the characterisation of thermal and nuclide signatures originating from these systems is discussed. Our analysis shows that the fertile capture-to-fission ratio is a significant correlation of relevance to SFM production and the unavoidable associated heat generation, varying substantially between different fusion designs and in comparison, to SFM production in some conventional (critical) fission reactors. This work also draws on well-established methods in nuclear forensics to detail aspects of fusion reactor typology and show how isotopic ratios of nuclear materials may vary between designs during and following irradiation. Finally, it discusses how these indicators may provide support to monitoring, origin attribution, and security considerations for emerging nuclear systems, including fusion and other high-intensity neutron source technologies.

Tomoki Yamaguchi

Mr. Yamaguchi currently serves as Deputy Director of the Integrated Support Centre for Nuclear Non-proliferation, Security and Human Resource Development (ISCN) at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). His areas of expertise include disarmament, safeguards, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear security.

He joined the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (now JAEA) in 1995 and worked on safeguards and physical protection at reprocessing, MOX fuel fabrication, and uranium enrichment facilities. He subsequently served with the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Japan’s national safeguards authority (JSGO), and the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a Safeguards Inspector covering countries of the former Soviet Union.

He has extensive experience in the technical, policy, and international aspects of safeguards, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear security.